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6.1  Introduction 
In recent years, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) have relaxed their rules concerning the relationship 
between “upstairs” brokerage firms and “downstairs” specialists. Since 1986, 
large broker-dealers have acquired specialist units on the floor of the NYSE, 
and some smaller broker-dealers have acquired specialists on the floor of the 
AMEX. This paper exploits this structural change to evaluate whether the pre- 
vious  restrictions  against  integration  of  brokerage  and  specialist  functions 
served investors’ best interests. 
The traditional objections to this integration suggest two mechanisms by 
which integration can lead to higher trading costs.’ First, integration between 
broker-dealers  and  specialist units might  lead to agency problems.  For ex- 
ample, suppose that a customer can readily observe the quoted spread, but has 
difficulty  determining  if  she received  best  execution. An  integrated broker 
might provide a worse execution  because of its incentive to route its trades 
through its affiliated dealer, rather than searching for the best price. Second, 
integration could lead to higher trading costs for unintegrated brokers, what 
Salinger (1988) has referred to as “foreclosure.” As applied to this industry, 
integration may allow the specialist to increase trading costs for trades from 
other broker-dealers. In general, the degree of vertical integration within a firm 
is endogenous, and changes in the degree of vertical integration are rare and 
Robert Neal is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City. David Reiffen is a 
senior economist at the Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed in this chapter are those 
of the authors and do not represent those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual com- 
missioner. 
1. We  use the term trading cost to refer to the costs of  making a trade, taking into account 
effective bid-ask spreads, commissions, and so forth. While this term is often used interchangeably 
with “transactions” cost by  financial economists, “transactions” cost may mean something com- 
pletely different to industrial organization economists. 
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result from (typically) unobserved events. For this reason, it is difficult to test 
theories of vertical integration. In this industry, however, the recent integration 
resulted from a policy change, mitigating the usual identification problem. 
Using data on combinations of broker-dealers and specialist units between 
1987 and  1993, we test for evidence supporting these two hypotheses. The 
tests consist of comparisons of bid-ask spreads, execution quality, depth, vol- 
ume, and order flow patterns for a one-month period before the integration to 
the corresponding post-acquisition period. In each case, we  test the null hy- 
pothesis that integration does not increase trading costs against the one-sided 
alternative that integration is associated with higher trading costs. 
The two hypotheses suggest different sources of  higher trading costs. The 
pure agency hypothesis predicts that there will be no change in spreads (which 
are relatively easy to monitor), but execution quality (which is difficult to mon- 
itor) will decrease for the integrated exchange, as the integrated firm shifts its 
order flow pattern. Execution quality on the nonintegrated exchanges would be 
unaffected. The pure foreclosure hypothesis predicts that, across all exchanges, 
spreads will widen, execution quality will diminish, and aggregate volume will 
be reduced. 
Our results provide little support for these hypotheses. We do not find evi- 
dence that execution quality has suffered. There is no virtually  no change in 
NYSE execution quality for the NYSE integrated stocks, and a slight increase 
in execution  quality for the integrated stocks on the regional exchanges. We 
do, however, find a diversion of order flow and a reduction in average trade 
size on the regional exchanges. These findings are consistent with the rerouting 
of retail orders and suggest some alternative motivation for these acquisitions. 
We offer two conjectures. First, vertical integration may facilitate profitable 
trading against uninformed retail orders. Second, it is possible that the special- 
ist units that were acquired had been managed in a way that did not maximize 
their value. While we present some evidence consistent with these alternatives, 
such analysis is not the focus of this paper. However, since on average investors 
have not  been hurt by  integrations, we believe  a policy  of  restricting these 
acquisitions is ill-advised. 
6.2  Overview of Industry Structure 
6.2.1  Overview of the Markets 
Two distinct market transactions are involved in turning a retail customer’s 
wish to trade into an executed trade. First, the customer places the order with 
a retail broker, who charges a price (commission) for this service. The broker 
then arranges for the order to be executed, usually on an organized market.* If 
the  trade  is executed  on  an  organized  market,  there  is typically  a bid-ask 
2. Some trades are executed internally (or “crossed”) at the firm. 179  The Effect of Integration between Broker-Dealers and Specialists 
spread, which provides revenue to the firm  executing the transaction, be it a 
specialist or a market maker. The two transactions-order  taking and execu- 
tion-are  complementary in the usual economic sense that a decrease in the 
cost of execution will increase the demand for retail brokerage services. Alter- 
natively, one can view executions as an input into the “retail trades” product 
sold by broker dealers. From this perspective, one can view the two markets 
as vertically related to one an~ther.~ 
The right to trade any individual security on the NYSE is a proprietary right 
assigned to a single specialist. While the NYSE specialist is the only agent on 
the floor of that exchange making a market in any particular stock, that special- 
ist faces competition from other sources, such as the specialists on the regional 
exchanges, private crossing networks, and the National Association of Securi- 
ties Dealers (NASD) for stocks listed after 1979. The right to trade a stock on 
each regional exchange is similarly proprietorially assigned to one firm.  Hence, 
one specialist on each regional exchange competes, or potentially competes 
(since not all NYSE stocks are actively traded on every regional exchange), 
with the NYSE specialist in that stock. 
The competition between  specialists is restricted  by  Securities and  Ex- 
change Commission (SEC) regulations. Specifically, barring unusual circum- 
stances, no trade can be executed outside the best intermarket bid or ask. For 
example, suppose the specialist on the Chicago exchange offers a bid of 59%, 
and the best bid among other exchanges if 59%. The Chicago regional special- 
ist must pay at least 59% if he is to execute that trade. It is important to recog- 
nize that this does not mean that all exchanges offer the same price. This holds 
for two reasons. First, the Chicago specialist is not obligated to trade at 5978, 
while the specialist offering 59% is obligated to purchase some shares at that 
price. Second, and more interesting from our perspective, specialists may offer 
better prices than the best intermarket bid or ask. This phenomenon, known as 
price improvement, is fairly common. In their study of realized retail trading 
prices, Petersen and Fialkowski (1  994) find that price improvement occurred 
for 35 percent of trades, while Blume and Goldstein (1992) estimate the figure 
to be between  12 and 31 percent. Evidence also suggests that the extent of 
price improvement varies across exchanges. Lee (1993) finds significant differ- 
ences in realized spreads across exchanges, with the NYSE generally offering 
better prices than the regional exchanges, NASD, or In~tinet.~ 
The relevance of specialist competition to the retail customer is that a broker 
can obtain different prices from different specialists. Hence, ignoring the bro- 
ker’s cost of searching, retail customers will be best served by brokers shopping 
across different exchanges. In this sense, specialists compete by offering more 
price improvement to the broker (and ultimately to the customer). 
3. As Tirole notes (1988), the same analysis applies whether one thinks of  the two markets as 
4.  For Lee’s sample stocks in 1988 and 1989, only the Cincinnati Stock Exchange offered lower 
vertically related or complements. 
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Offering price improvement is not the only means by which specialists com- 
pete. At least two other means of  competing  have been  observed. First, ex- 
changes may choose different rules governing transactions, which in turn affect 
the broker’s choice of exchange. For example, during the time period we exam- 
ined, the NYSE rules mandated that a “crossed” trade (where a broker-dealer 
represents private parties on both  sides of  the trade) must  “clear” the order 
book.5 The regional exchanges are not limited by such restrictions, so that cer- 
tain types of trades are attracted to the regional exchanges. 
Second, exchanges might offer other inducements to attract trades. In partic- 
ular, some specialists (and third-market firms) offer direct payments to brokers 
in exchange for the opportunity to trade against retail transactions. This prac- 
tice, known as payment for order flow, has been criticized by both academics 
and practitioners. For example, Lee (1993) questions the “propriety of order 
flow inducements which may impair broker’s independence in pursuing best 
execution”  (1009). Similarly, Blume and Goldstein  (1  992) raise the concern 
that payment for order flow results in worse prices for retail consumers. This 
same issue has been raised by NYSE chairman William Donaldson, who has 
argued for regulatory action to ban such paymenkc 
Clearly, a similar incentive might be created by the broker owning a special- 
ist. In fact, it seems reasonable that the potential for consumers to receive infe- 
nor execution would be amplified by integration. As compared to contractual 
arrangements such as payment for order flow, vertical integration harmonizes 
the incentives of the broker and the market maker. For example, suppose that 
it is more profitable to trade against retail transactions than professional  trad- 
ers, so that specialists are only willing to pay for retail order flow. An integrated 
broker will have more incentive to screen out professional trades than a broker 
receiving payment for order flow.’ Given the obvious similarity between inte- 
gration  and  payment  for order flow, however, our  analysis of the effect  of 
integration on trading cost offers insight on the effect of both practices. 
6.2.2  Exchange Rules Governing Broker-Specialist Relations 
Prior  to  1986, both  the  NYSE and AMEX had  rules  governing  broker- 
specialist relations, which had the effect of preventing such ownership.* Indi- 
viduals  affiliated  with member  firms of  the exchange (“approved  persons”) 
could not simultaneously own a specialist unit and carry out normal brokerage 
5. Clearing the order book means that all limit orders at prices more favorable than the crossing 
price must be executed before the crossed trade is executed. For example, suppose the specialist’s 
bid is 59, his ask is 60, and there is a limit order to buy at 59Y4. If  two other agents agree to 
trade at S9%, NYSE rules require that the specialist or the broker take the opposite side of the 
limit order. 
6.  See David A. Vise, “NYSE Chief Urges Ban on Cash Payments,” Wushington Posr, April  IS, 
1993, D11. 
7. This is discussed more fully in section 6.5. 
8. NYSE rules 104, 104-13,  105, 113-20; AMEX rules 190, 193. 181  The Effect of  Integration between Broker-Dealers and Specialists 
 operation^.^ Changes in the rules were proposed in 1985 and enacted in 1986. 
These rules allowed brokers affiliated with specialists to continue their broker- 
age operations in all securities as long as appropriate steps were taken to pre- 
vent certain abuses. In particular, a “Chinese Wall” was to be established to 
prevent the exchange of certain information between the specialist and broker- 
age units. For example, individuals associated with the brokerage unit are not 
allowed  access to the specialist’s “order book.”  Similarly, individuals at the 
brokerage entity who are privy to nonpublic information about the specialist’s 
securities cannot relate that information to the affiliated specialist. 
When the rule changes were proposed, the SEC issued a release describing 
the proposed changes and soliciting comments on the issues raised.’O  The com- 
mission received thirteen comment letters, including seven by firms or organi- 
zations opposed to the rule change.” 
These  seven  commentators  pointed  to  two  general  concerns  regarding 
broker-specialist  integration. First,  several expressed  concern  that the  inte- 
grated brokers would route orders toward their affiliated specialists, to the det- 
riment of other specialists and retail customers. In the following sections, we 
describe several reasons that changes in order flow can both be profitable and 
reduce welfare. The second general concern was that the Chinese Wall proce- 
dure would be inadequate to prevent information from passing between spe- 
cialists and brokers. 
Those commentators supporting the change, as well as the SEC staff, noted 
the potential for increased capitalization of specialists that would result from 
integration. These comments suggested that this would result in increased li- 
quidity and deeper markets. While these claims may  describe the effect of 
integration, they do not explain the broker’s incentive to integrate. That is, why 
is it profitable to increase the capitalization of  a specialist? Moreover, if in- 
creased capitalization increases profits, why are brokers particularly well posi- 
tioned to supply that capital? 
Since 1988, several large brokers have taken advantage of the rule changes 
and acquired specialist units. Table 6.1 lists the acquisitions. From the stand- 
point of our analysis, the most relevant aspect of these acquisitions is that the 
broker acquires the right to act as a specialist in the NYSE stocks previously 
served by  the independent  specialist. This is the relevant aspect because, to 
9. An approved person affiliated with a specialist could not (1) trade in securities in which the 
specialist made the market, (2) trade options on those securities, (3) accept orders in those securi- 
ties, (4)  undertake research in those securities, or (5)  “popularize” those securities. 
10. Securities Exchange Act Release no. 22396 (September  11, 1985), 50 Federal Register 
37925. 
11. These comments include those of the Boston exchange and Chicago Board of Exchange; 
Morgan Stanley; AT&T; Wertheim and  Co. (NYSE brokers); Faganson, Frankel, and  Steicher 
(NYSE specialists); and Wedbush, Noble, and Cook (brokers and specialists on other exchanges). 
Favorable comments were filed by  most major NYSE brokers and several small NYSE brokers 








































BCC,  CCK,  ENS,  EP,  ETN,  GCI,  GPC, 
GRA, GRN, GSX, KMB, KR, KRI, MEA, 
MU, NLB, PPG, SNT, TMC, TRB, VFC 
AMW, BIC, BZR, CET,  EXC, FGF,  FGI, 
GHM, GOT, GRM, HPX, JHI, KVN, NAB, 
NNY, NPK, NWN, OBS, OXM, PNY, PWN, 
RBC, SCX, SIE, SNO, STW,  SYM, TDS. 
TPL, TR, TXI 
AA, ABX,  AFL, AIR, ALD,  ALX, AMR, 
APA,AR, BGE, BRC, CC, CCB, CLE, CPB, 
CS, DBD, DDS, DRM, EGG, EY, FOE, FRP, 
FTX,  GTY,  HSY,  ICE,  IF,  KAB,  MAS, 
MCK,  MMC,  MST,  MXM,  MXS,  NCC, 
NSI, NWL, PHI, PLL, RYC, SB, SC, SPW, 
TNV, UCC, WIT 
AFP, BRO, CMB, CQB, CW, CYR, DWW, 
ELJ, ESY, FMR, FSS, HI, ICL, KBH, LTD, 
LUV, LZB, MGF, SCT, SCZ, TDM, TEK, 
TJX, TYC, UCO, UCU, UJB, URS, USH, 
USR, UTR, UVX, WBN, WFC 
AGL. AIZ, AME, APH, BAC, BBT,  BDG, 
BDK, BGT, BKT, BNE, BTV, CAG, CCL, 
CHH, CMO, CMZ, CNG, CSC, CTS, ED, 
FQA, FWC, GII, GIM, GMT, GNC, GPS, 
GWW, I, IMC, ISS, JF,  KEM, KUT, KIM, 
KMM, KTF, KTM, MDA, MHP, NBL, NEF, 
NMG, NPI, NT, 011, PCH, PCP, PGT, PIR, 
PMM, PNC, PPT, RBD, REL, ROK, RYL, 
SME, TMX, TRH, VFM, VIT, VKM, VLT, 
VMT,  VNM,  VOD,  VSH,  WGO,  WIN, 
WNC, WR. XRX, ZE 
ACK, AMI, AMP,  BNL, CCN, CMY, DH, 
DOV,  FDO,  FSI,  LM,  LOW,  OHM, SEE, 
SK, V,  WHT, WMT 
ACY, ADI, ALG, AMD, APC, APD, AVE, 
BCP, BEV, BFI, BS, BYS, CH, CIR, CKE, 
CSM, DJ, FAX, FTU, GT, HE, HMS, HPC, 
HPH, KKS, LDS, LIT, LLX, MAH, MCN, 
NCM,  NIC,  NMI, PGR,  PIF,  PKD,  PKN, 
PWJ, PZL, RCP, REC, RGS, RPC, SI, SVT, 
TMD, TRW, TSO, UAL, UK, UNM, UNP, 
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Table 6.1  (continued) 
Acquiring  Specialist  Acquisition 
Firm  Unit  Date 
Stocks 
NYSE 
Bear Steams  Asiel & Co. 
Drexel Specialist  Pforzheimer & 
co.  co. 
Merrill Lynch  A. B. Tompane 
Paine Wcbbcr  dcCordova Cooper 
Philadelphia Exchange 
Shearson Lchman  Bloom Stalof 
Control stocks 
1/1/88  AA, AET, BK, DNB, HF,  HMC, JC, MUO, 
PRE, PST, TX 
AFL, AN, ANC, BCF, DEX, GAB, GMI, 
HNH, HYP, IAD, JCI, KU, KUH, NUV, 
OPC, PNS, TII, USR, WDG 
ALN, CHL, CRN, DLT, ENE, FQA, FTK, 
GFC, HB, HFF, MST, RD, STY, TEP, WMB, 
X 
ABY, ACP, BP, BTU, CBT, CHG, DRV, E, 
EXP, FW,  GEC, GPO, GWW, HTN, HUG, 
IBM, LAW,  MEI,  SDP, SWX, TAC, TAN, 




612619 1  AA, AIG, AMB, AMR, AN, AR, ARC,ASA, 
AU,  BAC,  BCC,  BCS,  BEL,  BZF,  CBS, 
CCI, CDE, CHV, CLD, CLX, CWE, F,  GP, 
GPU, GRN, HL, ITT, LNC, MDR, MMM, 
MOT, MRO, MTC, NVO, ORX, P, PBI, PD, 
PDG,  PG,  PH, RTZ,  S, SBO,  SO,  SUN, 
SYN,TX, USR, WBB, WMT, WU, X, XON, 
ZE 
ACB, AEG, AIP, AL, AP, ASO, ATN, AVY, 
BAX, BEN, BK, BKR, BN, BRK, C, CAS, 
CBR, CFI, CHX, CLT, CMA, CNL, CPH, 
CRS, CTC, CTK, CVT,  DEC, DJI,  DNB, 
DSP, EDE,  EEI, EMR,  ETZ, FCA, FLM, 
FPC, GAL, GER, GM, GOU, GRO, HCA, 
HEI, HMC, HRE, HWL, IEI, IR, JBM, JH, 
KEY,  KML, KNO,  KZ,  LGN,  LPI,  LPX, 
MA, MAM, MD, MGC, MM, MRT, MXF, 
NER, NL, NSP, OIL, OSL, PAT, PEG, PIN, 
POR,  PSC,  RAY,  RJF,  ROG,  RUS,  SCE, 
SDY,  SGI,  SJT,  SNA, SRR,  SVM, TAC, 
TBP, TEF, TIN, TOY, TXF, UFF, UPT, VAT, 
VRC, WID, WOL, WRE, Y 
the extent that the  acquisitions adversely affect trading costs, those adverse 
consequences can be observed on the stocks in the integration. 
In section 6.5, we describe how trading costs have been affected by integra- 
tion. We find that trading costs do not appear to have changed much following 
the  NYSE integrations.  The evidence  on the  regional  integrations  is more 184  Robert Neal and David Reiffen 
ambiguous, although it is difficult to ascribe the observed effects to any one 
cause. 
To  generalize from past experience to future acquisition, however, would 
require that future acquisitions resemble past acquisitions. Based on our con- 
versations  with practitioners,  we  think  that  the  specialists  acquired  on the 
NYSE since 1988 have generally been less well capitalized and had received 
lower rankings from the exchange than the average NYSE specialist.”  Hence, 
in  generalizing  these  results  to future acquisitions,  one must consider how 
these selectivity issues influence the effects of integration. For example, it may 
be that, while the effect of an acquisition on undercapitalized specialists is to 
reduce trading costs, the effect of  integration between a broker and a well- 
capitalized specialist might increase trading costs. 
6.3  Formalizing the Objections to Vertical Integration 
As we discussed in the introduction, many of the comment letters expressed 
concern that trading costs would increase following integration. In this section, 
we develop descriptive and highly stylized models to provide economic con- 
tent  to these concerns. In constructing these  models, our goal is to include 
enough relevant features of the market to generate testable predictions. 
6.3.1  Agency Problems with Integration 
SEC rules require stock brokers to provide “best execution” for retail cus- 
tomers. This does not mean that brokers are at all times required to maximize 
the price a retail  seller receives  (or minimize the price a retail buyer pays), 
since other factors, such as timeliness of the execution, are also relevant. Nev- 
ertheless, brokers do have a fiduciary responsibility  to obtain the best price, 
other things equal. 
It is possible that integration between brokers and specialists would under- 
mine the broker’s best execution responsibilities.” As noted above, brokers can 
frequently obtain “price improvement” on customer’s trades: obtaining offers 
from competing specialists that are better than the best intermarket bid or ask. 
On the other hand, if an integrated broker routed its orders through its affiliated 
specialist, rather than comparing offers of competing specialists, it is possible 
that the integrated broker’s customers would receive an execution inferior to 
that received by  an unintegrated broker’s customers. This possibility  has also 
been raised by Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993). 
To formalize this potential agency problem, we present a simple model in 
which integration can affect realized trading costs. First, we assume that there 
12. The NYSE ranks specialists according to several criteria of  efficacy. These rankings are not 
made public, but our understanding is that most of the acquired specialists were in the lower half 
of  all specialists by this measure. 
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exists a class of customers for whom specialists are willing to give discounts 
(price improvement).14  We assume all of these customers can observe the com- 
missions  charged  by  brokers,  but  only  a percent  of  them  can  determined 
whether they received best execution. Further, we assume that a dissatisfied 
customer can cancel the transaction, resulting in lost commi~sion.’~  Finally, we 
assume that the broker has zero cost of obtaining quotes from specialists. Then 
a broker’s gain from searching is aC  (where C is the profit margin on commis- 
sions), and its cost is zero. Hence, absent integration, brokers will search for 
the best price.I6 
Consider the incentive of an integrated broker-specialist, under the assump- 
tion that the vertically integrated specialists can distinguish the orders of these 
customers from the rest of their 0rders.l’  Such an integrated firm gains aC 
from trying to obtain best execution for its customers, but loses the opportunity 
to trade its internal order flow at the posted bid or ask. The gains to trading 
these orders at the posted bid or ask is (1 -  m)(l -  a)T + m(1 -  a)(T -  t), 
where T = ((posted price) -  (the cost of making the trade)l (i.e., the integrated 
specialist’s trading profit);  t is the trading profit on the trades the specialist 
would have made (i.e., absent “misrouting” due to agency problems); and m is 
the integrated specialist’s market share, absent misrouting.I8 It will pay to route 
these orders internally as long as aC  <  (1 -  a)(T -  mt).  That is, for a,  m, and 
t sufficiently small, and Thigh, it will pay to direct order flow internally. When 
this inequality holds, (1 -  a)  of this firm’s customers are worse off. 
If  these conditions hold, testable predictions  arise for changes in  spread, 
execution quality, and order flow following integration. First, since the inte- 
grated broker-specialist wants to target retail customers, it will adjust the trad- 
ing price for those customers only. This is most easily accomplished by the 
14. Specifically, we are thinking of  retail customers (who typically place small orders) as a 
class likely to obtain price improvement. Several sources provide evidence consistent with this 
assumption. First, Lee (1993) notes that orders sold for payment must be of small size and nonpro- 
fessional. Second, Petersen and Fialkowski (l994), whose data consist of retail orders only, report 
a greater degree of price improvement than Blume and Goldstein (1992). whose data include all 
trades. Finally, the assumption is consistent with Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Keim and Madha- 
van (1992). who argue that small orders are less likely to be information based. 
15. This assumption simplifies the model by  allowing us to incorporate “punishment” into a 
static game. Seppi (1990) employs a similar assumption to explain why informed investors do not 
behave opportunistically in a static model. More realistically, we could obtain similar results if a 
percent of customers choose their brokers on the basis of past price improvement, or if the SEC 
would (with some probability) impose a sanction on brokers who did not provide best execution. 
16. More generally, brokers will search as long as their search cost is less than uC. 
17. This assumption seems realistic. For example, among the information available to NYSE 
specialists on SuperDOT orders are the type of order (market, limit, or tick sensitive), buys, and 
the member firm originating the order. Hasbrouck and Sosebee (1992) also state that the identity 
of the member firm originating the order is a valuable signal of the underlying strategy of the 
trade. Virtually all NYSE retail orders go through SuperDOT. 
18. One way of  thinking about T and r is to suppose there are implicitly two spreads-one  for 
retail customers and a larger one for professional customers-and  both spreads are equal to the 
cost of tradmg with those customers. Then r = 0, and T >  0 is the difference in trading cost across 
the two classes. 186  Robert Neal and David Reiffen 
integrated firm’s reducing execution quality on orders for their own retail cus- 
tomers, without changing bid-ask spreads. Second, the  incentive to provide 
execution quality on orders from other brokers is unaffected by integration, so 
that the integrated specialist continues to compete with other specialists to 
obtain these orders.I9 This means that execution quality on other exchanges 
will be unaffected by integration. Third, since the integrated broker shifts some 
orders to its integrated specialist, the market share of the integrated exchange 
will rise following integration. Finally, since m is smaller on the regional ex- 
changes, the agency problem is most severe there.2n  The first column of table 
6.2 summarizes these predictions, which are then tested against our data. 
In addition to the predictions that are testable with our data, this model sug- 
gests other changes that are potentially measurable. For example, this model 
suggests that the market share of the integrated broker declines (since a  per- 
cent of  its would-be customers go elsewhere). Also, the model suggests that 
the retail customers of the integrated firm get less price improvement  on the 
integrated exchange than  other retail  customers on that exchange. Similarly, 
these customers get worse execution on vertically integrated stocks than they 
do on other stocks, ceteris paribus.  With a more refined data set, it may be 
possible to test these predictions. 
6.3.2  Foreclosure Effects of Integration 
Judicial interpretation of  antitrust law has long viewed vertical mergers as 
having  a potential for “foreclosing” rivals. The fear expressed has been that 
the  acquisition of  a customer or supplier would  lead  the  integrated firm  to 
reduce or eliminate its trade with nonintegrated  suppliers or customers. As 
Chief Justice Warren put it in Brown Shoe, “the dimunition of  the vigor of 
competition  which  may  stem from a vertical  arrangement results  primarily 
from a foreclosure of a share of the market otherwise open to competitors.”2’ 
A more rigorous conceptualization of  foreclosure was developed by Salinger 
(1988).  According to Salinger, a vertical merger leads to foreclosure if it in- 
creases the input cost faced by unintegrated firm~.~* 
Whether a vertical merger can result in foreclosure has long been debated 
in  the  economics  literat~re.~~  Recent  work  by  Ordover, Saloner,  and  Salop 
19. We assume away the possibility that other brokers, because of  payment for order flow or 
reciprocal agreements, are not acting in consumer interest. The benefit of integration relative to 
other means of competing for order flow is discussed below. 
20. This discussion abstracts from the constraints imposed on the specialist by competition from 
floor traders who wish to trade against the incoming orders. This suggests a second reason that 
agency problems may be more severe on regional exchanges, since the NYSE is a thicker market, 
and hence the NYSE specialist is more likely to face competition from floor traders on that ex- 
change. This also suggests that the agency problem will be most severe for thinly traded stocks on 
any exchange. 
21. Brown Shoe Co.  v.  United States, 370 US. 294 (1962), 328. 
22. As discussed below, foreclosure in this sense is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
23. See, for example, Comanor (1967). 
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Table 6.2  Summary of Agency and Foreclosure Model Predictions for 
Integrated and Nonintegrated Exchanges 
Variable  Agency Model  Foreclosure Model 
Volume  Decrease in total 
Effective spread  Increase for integrated 
No change for nonintegrated 
Median spread  No change for either type 
Price improvement  Decrease for integrated 
No change for nonintegrated 
Percentage of volume  Increase for integrated 
Decrease for nonintegrated 
Trade size  Decrease for integrated 
Increase for nonintegrated 
Depth  No change for either type 
Decrease in total 
Increase for both types 
Increase for both types 
Ambiguous for integrated 
Increase for nonintegrated 
Ambiguous for both types 
Ambiguous for both types 
Decrease for both types 
(1990,  1992) provides  a formal model under which vertical  integration can 
result in foreclosure. In their model, firms that produce differentiated products 
compete in each of  the two related marketsZ4  The markets are related in that 
firms in one market sell a product that is an input used by firms in the second 
market. Because firms are differentiated, the Bertrand equilibrium prices for 
all firms exceed marginal cost. 
In applying this model to financial markets, we view exchanges as supplying 
“execution services” to brokers. Brokers combine this input with retail broker- 
age services, and  sell the combined package as a “retail execution” to cus- 
tomer.  Exchanges  are  differentiated  in  that  they  offer  different  execution 
speed, depth, and the  ability to execute prearranged  crosses. The Ordover- 
Saloner-Salop  model  assumes  that  prior  to  integration,  at the  equilibrium 
prices (effective spreads), each broker routes some orders to each exchange. 
Following the integration, the foreclosure  model predicts that the increased 
market power created by the integration allows the integrated firm  to increase 
the effective price its specialist unit charges nonaffiliated brokers. This can be 
accomplished by increasing realized spreads, reducing depth, or similar means 
of making the integrated exchange less attractive to other brokers. The direct 
effect  of  this  change  shifts  out the demand  facing  specialists  on other ex- 
changes, whose optimal response is to increase their effective prices.25 Ulti- 
mately, by  increasing its rival brokers’  costs and prices, the integrated firm 
24. In their 1990 paper, input producers manufacture undifferentiated products, which implies 
that foreclosure can occur only when there are exactly two input producers. As this assumption 
does not fit the market of interest here, the model we present incorporates the suggestion made in 
their 1992 reply, that differentiated firms exist in both markets. We assume the differentiation in 
the two markets to be “orthogonal”; that is, consumers’ preferences across brokers are independent 
of their preferences across exchanges. 
25. Recall that exchanges are viewed as differentiated, so that an exchange would not capture 
100 percent of the market by  keeping its effective price constant when the integrated exchange 
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is able to increase its  market  share andor increase the price it charges for 
retail executions. 
Note that, while both the agency and the foreclosure theories imply higher 
trading costs, the means by which trading costs rise is likely to be different in 
the two cases. In the foreclosure model, the integrated firm  wants to increase 
its rivals’ costs of executing all trades in the integrated stock. Since most trades 
occur at the bid or the ask, this requires increasing spreads, or reducing depth. 
Hence, the foreclosure model implies higher spreads after integration, while 
the degree of price improvement received by  other brokers on the integrated 
exchange need not change. Further, the model predicts that the other exchanges 
would increase their prices, but by less than the integrated exchange. This im- 
plies that the extent of price improvement (measured from the inside bid or the 
ask) would rise,  although the realized trading cost (the absolute percentage 
difference between  the trade price and the quote midpoint) would increase. 
These predictions are summarized in the second column of table 6.2. 
6.4  Data and Summary Statistics 
Our analysis is based on all integrations that occurred on the New York, 
Boston, or Philadelphia stock exchanges  since 1987. There are four integra- 
tions at New York, seven at Boston, and one at Philadelphia. The correspond- 
ing numbers of stocks in these integrations are 72 in New York, 279 in Boston, 
and 55 in Philadelphia. For each integration, the date, brokerage firm, and 
ticker symbol of  the associated stocks are presented in table 6.1. This table 
also  contains  the  sample  of  101 control  stocks.  Randomly  selected  from 
NYSE, these stocks were continuously listed from 1987 to 1993 and were not 
involved in any of the above integrations. 
The data for our analysis are intraday  bid,  ask, and execution price data 
from the  Securities Industry Automation  Corporation (SIAC). To the extent 
possible, we examine four weeks of  trade data from a period three months 
before the integration, and another four weeks from a period three months after 
the integration. Because the SEC only periodically  saved the SIAC data, in 
some cases we can analyze only two weeks of data, in other cases the beforel 
after window is reduced to two months. 
It is an unfortunate fact of life that there are gremlins in the SIAC data. We 
have attempted to filter out obviously inconsistent values and used estimation 
procedures that minimize the impact of outliers. Nevertheless, the raw data set 
contains  eighteen  million  observations,  and  undoubtedly  some  gremlins 
remain. 
Summary statistics for the integrated and control stocks are presented  in 
table 6.3. Each panel contains four groups of statistics, and each group contains 
before-integration and after-integration statistics. In panels B and C, the first 
group contains  observations for the integrated  stocks on  the integrated ex- 
change. The second group contains observations for the control stocks on the Table 6.3  Summary Statistics 
A. Integrations on the New York Stock Exchangea 
Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks,  Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks, 
NYSE  NYSE  non-NYSE  non-NYSE 
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B. Integrations on the Boston Stock Exchange” 
Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks,  Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks, 
Boston  Boston  NYSE  NYSE 
Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
Median spread  2.628  2.629  2.694  2.547  1.421  1.127  1.424  1.263 
2.088  2.144  2.006  1.826  1.007  0.917  0.909  0.790 
0.126  0.119  0.098  0.096  0.095  0.074  0.073  0.064 
(continued) Table 6.3  (continued) 
B. Integrations on the Boston Stock Exchangeh 
Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks,  Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks, 
Boston  Boston  NYSE  NYSE 
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C. Integrations on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange' 
Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks,  Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks, 
Philadelphia  Philadelphia  NYSE  NYSE 
Before  After  Before  After  Bcforc  After  Before  After 
Median spread  1.831  2.383  2.684  2.802  0.709  0.709  1.516  1.355 
1.263  1.536  1.951  2.150  0.488  0.459  0.904  0.793 
0.220  0.327  0.259  0.276  0.082  0.085  0.197  0.179 
Effective  0.657  0.583  0.795  0.830  0.495  0.478  0.743  0.733 
spread  0.459  0.435  0.630  0.686  0.336  0.319  0.522  0.531 
0.080  0.060  0.071  0.073  0.059  0.055  0.065  0.067 191  The Effect of  Integration between Broker-Dealers and Specialists 
Table 6.3  (continued) 
C. Integrations on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange' 
Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks.  Integrated Stocks,  Control Stocks, 
Philadelphia  Philadelphia  NYSE  NYSE 
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Notes: For each group of statistics, the reported numbers are the mean, median, and standard error. These 
numbers refer to averages across firms. 
'These  statistics are based on four vertical integrations on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
These statistics are based on seven vertical integrations on the Boston Stock Exchange. 
'These statistics are based on one vertical integration on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 
integrated exchange. The third group contains NYSE observations for the inte- 
grated stocks. The fourth group contains NYSE observations for the control 
stocks. Panel A, which presents the NYSE integrations, differs in that the third 
and fourth groups contain observations from the other exchanges for the inte- 
grated and control stocks. 
To  analyze the effects of  integration, we examine several measures of trad- 
ing costs and trading volume. The median spread is computed from all bid and 
ask quotes. We  focus on the medians to mitigate the effect of  outliers. The 192  Robert Neal and David Reiffen 
effective spread is defined as twice the absolute value of difference between 
the trade price and the midpoint of the spread. This value is then scaled by the 
price level. The midpoint is obtained from the highest bid price and lowest ask 
price, across all markets. The price improvement variables are defined as the 
minimum of the ask price minus the trade price, or the trade price minus the 
bid. This variable is scaled by the price level and computed for trades less than 
or equal to three thousand shares, and trades more than three thousand shares. 
The percentage of trades and percentage of volume correspond to the fraction 
executed on the specified exchange (Boston, Philadelphia, or New York). Trad- 
ing volume represents the volume on the designated exchange. The depth is 
defined as the average of  the quoted bid size and the quoted ask size. For each 
variable, the values reported in table 6.3 represent averages across firms. The 
numbers presented in the table are the mean, median, and standard error. 
It is useful to compare these summary statistics on spreads and price im- 
provement to those in other recent work. The data on NYSE price improvement 
is consistent with Angel’s (1993) findings. He finds that on NYSE SuperDOT 
markets orders, average price improvement is 0.19 percent on buy orders, and 
0.23 percent on  sell orders. In our data, price improvement on small trades 
ranges  from  0.16 percent  to 0.24 percent.  Lee (1993) finds  that  effective 
spreads are about 14 cents on the NYSE and about 15 cents on the Boston and 
Philadelphia exchanges, or about two-thirds the level suggested by our data. 
The summary statistics suggest the impact of NYSE integrations on trading 
costs is minor. Relative to the control group, the NYSE integrated stocks show 
a similar decline in effective spreads. The spreads for the control stocks rise 
following  the  integration,  but  this  is  offset  by  greater  price  improvement 
among the control stocks. Following integration, the integrated stocks capture 
a larger fraction of trades and trading volume than the control stocks. 
Panels B and C show a roughly similar pattern for the Boston and Philadel- 
phia integrations. The effective spreads for the integrated stocks appear to de- 
crease by slightly more than the control stocks. Relative to the control stocks, 
however, the median spreads rise slightly following integration. As with the 
NYSE integrations, the integrated stocks exhibit an increase in the fraction of 
trades  and the fraction  of  trading  volume following  integration.  Unlike the 
NYSE integrations,  however, the  average trade  size shows a clear decrease 
following the regional integrations. Overall, these statistics are consistent with 
the  interpretation  that  vertical  integrations  do not  adversely  affect  trading 
costs. 
6.5  Regression Tests of Agency and Foreclosure Models 
In this section, we examine evidence from past acquisitions, with three pur- 
poses in mind. First, we look at measures of trading cost and volume to deter- 
mine whether the net effect of integration has been to increase or to decrease 
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market shares to test the models described in section 6.3. Finally, to the extent 
that the two proposed models do not explain the existing pattern, we present 
hypotheses that are consistent with the data, and offer some additional sugges- 
tive evidence. 
6.5.1  Overall Cost of Trading 
As noted in section 6.2, there are two components to retail trading cost: the 
bid-ask spread (the specialist’s price) and the broker’s commission. Since we 
have no data on the latter component, we use two approaches in order to draw 
some inferences from the changes resulting from broker-specialist integration. 
First, we assume that commissions are unaffected by integration and examine 
the effect of integration on measures of effective bid-ask spread. Second, we 
assume that, like other products, the demand for trading any stock is a decreas- 
ing function of the cost of doing so. This implies that changes in volume move 
inversely with changes in trading costs. 
The regression results in  table 6.4 offer additional evidence that broker- 
specialist integration on the NYSE has had little impact on trading costs. We 
measure this impact by regressing the difference between the median percent- 
age spreads after the integration and the median prior to integration against the 
percentage  change in price, percentage  change in  trade  size, change in  the 
standard deviation of quote midpoint returns, and the change in total volume 
across all exchanges. Parallel regressions are presented for the change in effec- 
tive spreads and for two measures of  the change in price improvement. The 
first price improvement  measure is based on all trades, while the second is 
computed only for small trades of less than three thousand shares. 
Panel A examines how the trading costs of NYSE integrated stocks change 
relative to nonintegrated NYSE stocks. Panel B examines how NYSE integra- 
tions affect the trading costs on the regional exchanges. The underlying stocks 
are the same in both panels, but panel A uses trades and quotes only from the 
NYSE, while panel B uses observations from the regional exchanges. In both 
panels, the dummy coefficients for the NYSE integrated firms are uniformly 
small, and the t-statistics are less than  1.25 in absolute value. The economic 
magnitude was similarly small. For example, in panel A, the median spreads 
increased by 0.027 percent following integration. This value is about 2 percent 
of the average percentage spread. 
The effects of integration on trading costs at the regional exchanges is pre- 
sented in table 6.5. Panel A examines how the trading costs of integrated stocks 
on the Boston  (or Philadelphia) exchange change relative to other stocks on 
Boston (or Philadelphia). Panel B examines whether the regional integrations 
affect the trading costs on the NYSE. Panel A uses trades and quotes only from 
the regional exchanges, while panel B uses observations from the NYSE. 
Overall, the results are largely consistent with table 6.4. There is no signifi- 
cant change in the median or effective spreads following integration. While the 
spreads tend to rise following integration, the only statistical difference is in 194  Robert Neal and David Reiffen 
Table 6.4  The Effect of NYSE Integrations on Trading Costs 
Dependent Variable 
Change in 9%  Change in % 
Median Spread  Effective Spread 
Change in Price  Improvement 
All Trades  Small Trades 
A. Effect on NYSE trading costsd 
Intercept  .0333 1 
(1.71) 
% change in price  -.6870S 
(-7.64) 
9% change in trade  -  ,04640 
size  (- 1.53) 
Change in standard  -  .007 I0 
deviation of returns  (-0.11) 
Change in volume  ,00099 
(millions)  (1.11) 
Integrated stock  -  .02765 
dummy  ( -  .065) 
R'  .I81 
Observations  278 
B. Effect on regional exchange trading costsh 
Intercept  ,12932 
(5.17) 
% change in price  -  ,84628 
(-7.22) 
% change in trade  -.00711 
size  (-0.64) 
Change in standard  -  ,05373 
deviation of returns  (-0.63) 
Change in volume  ,00209 
(millions)  (2.15) 
Integrated stock  -.01334 
dummy  (-0.25) 
R'  ,232 
Observations  180 
-  ,0007  1 
(-4.85) 




-  ,0006  I 
(-0.26) 






-  .00074 
(- .99) 
-  .OOS4 1 
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Nores: These cross-sectional regressions are based on four vertical integrations on the NYSE. Each obser- 
vation for the dependent variable is the beforehfter change for the same firm.  The dummy variable is one 
for the integrated stocks and zero otherwise. 
'All variables, both integrated and control, are measured on the NYSE. 
bAll variables, both integrated and control, are the average for the two regional exchanges. 
the price improvement  regressions. Integration on the regional exchanges is 
associated with somewhat more price improvement for small trades (t = 1.39) 
and with less price improvement for small trades on the NYSE (f = -2.36). 
Table 6.6 presents additional evidence on trading costs by  examining the 
change in trading characteristics following integration. The change in share of 
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Table 6.5  The Effect of Regional Integrations on Trading Costs 
Dependent Variable 
Change in Price  Improvement 
Median Spread  Effective Spread  All Trades  Small Trades 
Change in '%  Change in 9% 
A. Effect on regional trading costs" 
Intercept  .O I74  1  .00008  .00003  -  .00002 
( 1.42)  (0.52)  (0.14)  (-0.08) 
7c  change in price  -  .76576  -.004l  I  .OO I73  ,00274 
(- 15.70)  (-6.26)  (I .97)  (0.39) 
5%  change in trade size  -  .00506  -  .00002  .00004  ,00007 
(-1.14)  (-0.34)  (0.6)  (0.68) 
deviation of returns  (0.56)  (0.94)  (-0.3)  (-0. 13) 
Changc in standard  .03875  .00086  -.00037  -  ,0002  1 
Change in volume  .00024  .om02  -  .ooooo  -  .ooooo 
(millions)  (I  .77)  (0.99)  (-0.09)  (-0.21) 
Integrated  stock  .o I694  .0003 I  -.00033  -  .OW59 
dummy  (0.92)  ( 1.26)  (-1.1)  (- 1.39) 
R?  .5  I3  ,151  .025  ,037 
Observations  25  7  257  257  257 
B. Effect on NYSE trading costsh 
Intercept  .043  1 I  -.00010  .OOO32  .00030 
(3.79)  (-0.65)  (0.23)  (2.37) 
5%  change in price  -  ,55254  -  ,00557  .00016  .OOOO6 
(-12.74)  (-8.91)  (0.31)  (0.12) 
% change in trade size  -  .O I336  -.00011  .00013  .OOO 14 
(-0.59)  (-0.34)  (0.47)  (0.58) 
Change in standard  ,09306  .00286  -  ,00206  -  ,00206 
deviation of returns  ( I .54)  (0.33)  ( -  2.64)  (-3.03) 
Change in volume  ,003  I8  .00002  .OW0  I  -  .oooo  I 
(millions)  (1.16)  (0.5  1)  (0.43)  (-0.59) 
Integrated  stock  -.00479  ,00034  -  ,00054  -  .00048 
dummy  (-0.26)  (1.32)  (-2.3  I)  (-2.36) 
R'  ,178  . I03  ,016  ,020 
Observations  763  763  763  763 
Notes: These cross-sectional regressions are based on eight vertical integrations on the two regional ex- 
changes. Each observation for the dependent variable is the beforehfter change for the same firm. The 
dummy variable is one for the integrated stocks and zero otherwise. 
"All variables, both integrated and control, are measured on the relevant regional exchange. 
bAll variables, both integrated and control, are the average for the two regional exchanges. 
percentage  of  volume executed,  and the  change  in total  volume  are all re- 
gressed against a dummy variable for the integrated stocks. Panel A presents 
these regressions for the NYSE integrations and is based on NYSE observa- 
tions. Panel B contains the corresponding regressions for the regional integra- 
tions and is based on observations from the regional exchanges. 
An alternative way to measure the change in trading costs following integra- 196  Robert Neal and David Reiffen 
Table 6.6  The Effect of Integrations on the Characteristics of Trading 
Dependent Variable 
Change in 
Trade Share  Trade Size  Volume Share  (millions) 
Change in  '%  Change in  Change in  Total Volume 
A. Integrations on the NYSE 
Intercept  -2.7974  .I6907  -  1.898  I  -.I779 
1-5.83)  (4.60)  (-2.44)  (- 1.42) 
Integrated stock  2.843 1  -  . I0485  2.7938  -.0476 
dummy  (2.53)  (-  I .22)  (I  .53)  (-0.16) 
R'  ,022  .005  .008  0 
Observations  278  278  278  278 
B. Integrations of the regional exchangesh 
Intercept  . I339  ,4440  .  I286  1.7191 
(0.45)  (2.80)  (0.66)  (2.34) 
Integrated stock  1.7844  -  ,5493  .0660  -  .I X862 
dummy  (3.8)  (-2.18)  (0.2  I )  (-2.27) 
R'  ,053  .O I8  0  .02 
Observations  257  227  257  257 
"These  cross-sectional regressions are based on four vertical integrations on the NYSE. For all 
equations, the dependent variable is the beforehfer change in  that  variable for the NYSE. The 
dummy variable is one for the integrated stocks and zero otherwise. All variables, both integrated 
and control, are measured on the NYSE. 
bThese cross-sectional regressions are based on eight vertical integrations on the two regional 
exchanges. For all equations, the dependent variable is the befordafter change in that variable for 
that regional exchange. For the final equation, the dependent variable is the befordafter total vol- 
ume traded in the stock on all three exchanges. The dummy variable Is  one for the integrated 
stocks and zero otherwise. All variables, both integrated and control, are measured on the affected 
regional exchange. 
tion is to examine the change in trading volume. For the NYSE integrations, 
trading volume fell by 0.047 million shares relative to the control stocks, but 
the t-statistic is only -0.16.  A much stronger volume effect is observed for the 
regional exchanges. Relative to the control stocks, trading volume fell by  1.88 
million  shares, and  the  r-statistic  changes to  -2.27.  This corresponds  to  a 
substantial decrease  in total  trading volume.  Overall,  these  results are con- 
sistent  with  no change in  trading costs for the NYSE  integrations but pro- 
vide some support for increased trading costs following the regional integra- 
tions. 
The results  in  table 6.6 also suggest changes in the characteristics of the 
trading  process  for the  regional  exchanges.  Relative  to  the  control  stocks, 
stocks involved in the regional integrations captured an additional 1.78 percent 
of the total number of trades executed and average trade size on the regional 
exchange decreased by 54 percent. The corresponding t-statistics are 3.80 and 
-2.18.  The fraction of trading volume rose by 0.06 percent (t = 0.21), which 
reflects a trade-off between an increasing number of trades and a smaller trade 197  The Effect of  Integration between Broker-Dealers and Specialists 
size. The NYSE integrations  show  a somewhat different pattern. The inte- 
grated stocks increased their fraction of trades by 2.83 percent (t = 2.53) and 
their fraction of volume by  2.79 percent  (f = 1.53). Similar to the regional 
integrations, however, there is some evidence of a decrease in trade size, 
6.5.2  Testing Implications of the Agency and Foreclosure Models 
Our analysis of  the effect of  integration on trading costs suggests that the 
NYSE integrations had little effect on trading costs, while the regional integra- 
tions may have increased trading costs. While both the agency and the foreclo- 
sure explanations predict higher trading costs, their predictions for the effect 
of integration on effective spreads, trade size, and depth differ. The predictions 
of the two models are detailed in table 6.2. 
Our results, detailed in tables 6.4-6.6,  suggest that neither model explains 
the mechanism by which integration can lead to higher trading costs. For the 
NYSE integrations, the only significant changes are an increase in depth on 
the NYSE, and increased market share on the NYSE (particularly of trades). 
Neither of the changes are in the direction predicted by the foreclosure model, 
and only the increased market share is as predicted by the agency model. As 
predicted by the agency model, there is a small, although not statistically sig- 
nificant, reduction  in price improvement  on the integration  stocks, but  two 
other effects undermine this interpretation. First, the size of  the reduction in 
price  improvement  is  smaller  on the  NYSE than  on  the  regionals  for the 
NYSE-integrated stocks. Second, the decrease in NYSE price improvement is 
larger (and more significant) for all trades than for small trades. This is con- 
trary to the notion that small, naive traders would be disadvantaged. Also note 
that while none of the changes in trading costs that occurred on the regional 
exchanges are consistent with the foreclosure model, none of the changes are 
significant. 
There are some significant changes associated with the regional integration 
(most importantly the effect of total volume), but again, most of the changes 
are not along the lines predicted by either model. For example, these integra- 
tions seem to have reduced price improvement significantly on the NYSE, but 
neither model predicts such a change. We also note that effective spreads actu- 
ally fell on the NYSE, albeit not significantly. Similarly, median posted and 
effective spreads rose (not significantly) on the regional exchange experiencing 
the integration, while price improvement  actually increased. This is not the 
pattern associated with either model. Hence, even if trading costs did rise, as 
the volume data suggest, some other explanation needs to be found. 
6.5.3 
The evidence presented thus far supports the notion that the NYSE integra- 
tions have not resulted in higher trading costs, while the effect of the regional 
integrations is ambiguous. If the motivation for integration was not of the type 
described in section 6.3, an alternative motivation must exist. 
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One potential motive for an acquisition is to better distinguish among classes 
of traders. For example, as discussed in section 6.2, suppose it is more costly 
for the specialist to trade against orders from those who have better informa- 
tion than he has (informed traders), than to trade against those with the same 
or worse information as the specialist  (uninformed traders). If  the specialist 
can limit his transactions to trading against uninformed traders he can, ceteris 
paribus, earn higher profits. 
This view provides an explanation for the practice of payment for order flow, 
and is consistent with specialists willing to pay for small, retail (i.e., nonprofes- 
sional) order flow only. It is reasonable to assume that brokers possess knowl- 
edge regarding which traders are professional, and that professional orders are 
more likely to be information based.26  If one assumes that the broker has useful 
information regarding whether the trader is informed, this explanation implies 
that the payment the specialist makes to the broker is one way that specialists 
compete for the opportunity to trade against uninformed retail orders. In turn, 
competition  among  brokers  may  then  result  in  lower  commissions  being 
charged to retail customers. That is, payment for order flow results in a kind 
of  market  segmentation;  retail  orders  implicitly  face lower trading  cost  re- 
flecting the lower cost of dealing with such customers. 
Broker-specialist  integration  may  be  an alternative,  and more  complete, 
means of accomplishing  the same objective. Integration may dominate pay- 
ment for order flow because an integrated broker has more incentive to sepa- 
rate informed from uninformed  Integration would allow the specialist 
to outbid other floor traders for the orders from the integrated broker because 
only the specialist knows that the orders are retail (uninformed) orders. This is 
similar to the model in Seppi (1990). In his model, because the broker can 
identify the individual institutional  trader, a separating equilibrium emerges 
where uninformed institutions trade with the broker, and informed institutions 
trade with an unaffiliated market maker. In both models. the information about 
the identity of the customer allows the broker to trade with uninformed  (and 
hence less costly) customers. 
This “separation”  hypothesis  implies that, following integration, the inte- 
grated specialist’s trades will be characterized by a reduction in average trade 
size or, equivalently, by an increase in market share of trades and, to a lesser 
extent, market share of volume. One would also anticipate improved execution 
for small trades on the integrated exchange, and worse execution for trades on 
26. Keim and Madhavan (1992) and Eastey and OHara  (1987) show that small orders are less 
likely to be information based as well. Since specialists know the size of an order, however, the 
valuable component of  the broker’s knowledge concerns the identity of  the individual placing 
the order. 
27. In a static (i.e., no repeat interaction) environment, the unintegrated broker has no incentive 
to screen out informed traders, since it realizes none of the costs of the specialist trading against 
informed traders. As the perceived length of  its relationship with the specialist increases, the bro- 
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the  other exchanges.  Finally, one would  expect  to  observe larger  effective 
spreads on small trades  for those stocks when  they are traded on other ex- 
changes. 
The results in tables 6.4-6.6  are broadly consistent with this conjecture. The 
integrations on the regional exchanges resulted in an increased market share 
of trades and a decreased trade size. Additionally, price improvement on small 
trades increased on the regional exchanges, but declined on the NYSE follow- 
ing the regional integrations. The NYSE integrations led to a similar effect 
on market share, although the statistical significance is lower. However, price 
improvement declined on all exchanges following the NYSE integration, not 
just on the regionals, contrary to the conjecture. Another implication of  this 
explanation is that the  integrated broker’s  ability to attract retail  customers 
should increase as a result of integration. This implication is potentially  test- 
able if data on individual broker’s market shares of order flow at the retail level 
were available. 
A second potential motivation for a broker to acquire a specialist is one that 
is not unique to the broker-specialist relationship, but rather common to many 
acquisitions. If any firm is managed in a way that does not maximize the value 
of that firm, alternative management teams may attempt to acquire control of 
the firm. Thus, specialist firms may be acquired simply because they are not 
well managed. One reason brokers may be the acquirers is that, by virtue of 
their relationship with many specialists, brokers know which specialist units 
are poorly managed. 
Data on profitability  of  specialists is not readily available. However, one 
measure of  how well a specialist is managed is the ranking it gets from the 
NYSE. The NYSE ranking is based on characteristics such as average spread 
and depth in the traded stocks. As noted above, although the rankings are non- 
public, industry sources indicate that the acquired specialists had relatively low 
rankings. This is consistent with our data. On all three exchanges, the stocks 
of the acquired specialists had significantly lower market shares (of both vol- 
ume and trades) than the average stock on that exchange.  Moreover, for all 
three exchanges, the share of the affected stocks being traded on the integrated 
exchange rose. For the Boston and New York exchanges, this increase occurred 
despite a general reduction in the market share of that exchange over the pe- 
riod. While the Philadelphia exchange’s share of trading in all stocks increased 
over the sample period, the increase in the affected stocks far exceeded the 
general increase in the exchange’s market share. A second factor supporting 
the idea that ratings rose is that the depth increased in Boston and New York 
following integration. Average depth on the Boston exchange rose by nearly 
three standard errors, and the New York change was about two standard errors. 
The effect of  the Philadelphia acquisition, however, was to reduce depth by 
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6.6  Conclusion 
This paper examined the effect of brokers acquiring specialists on the NYSE 
and  two  regional  exchanges.  These  acquisitions,  particularly  those  on  the 
NYSE, provide us an opportunity to examine the effect of  an increase in the 
degree of vertical integration within a firm. 
Two theories  have been  proposed  that suggest that  such an increase may 
work  to the disadvantage  of  investors:  an  agency theory  and a foreclosure 
model. We derived testable implications of these theories and, using transac- 
tion data, tested some of the implications. We find that, even for acquisitions 
where investors may have been harmed, neither theory accounts for the mecha- 
nism. Hence, neither provides much insight into the motivation for these acqui- 
sitions. 
The changes we do observe are reductions in average trade size on the inte- 
grated exchanges, and a divergence of order flow. These findings are consistent 
with the rerouting of retail orders and suggest some alternative motivation for 
these acquisitions. We offer two conjectures in this regard. First, vertical inte- 
gration may facilitate profitable trading against uninformed retail orders. Sec- 
ond, it is possible that the specialist units that were acquired had been managed 
in a way that did not maximize their value. We offer some suggestive evidence 
consistent with these alternatives. Further work, or alternative models, would 
expand our understanding of financial markets and, more generally, the deter- 
minants of the degree of vertical integration. 
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Comment  Philip H. Dybvig 
The effect of  vertical  integration by broker-dealers  and specialists is a very 
good example of the theme of this conference. This question of  whether such 
vertical integration is good or bad is not firmly within the domain of  either 
industrial organization or finance, and benefits from simultaneous illumination 
from both disciplines. From industrial organization, we have traditional views 
of vertical integration producing possible synergy gains or reducing competi- 
tion. From finance, we have views that such mergers may increase the conflict 
of interest between broker-dealers and their clients (which conflict is already 
significant absent the integration, especially given that broker-dealers can trade 
on their own account), and we have the notion that the more highly capitalized 
broker-dealers will tend to increase liquidity  and stabilize the market.  Con- 
straining all of these effects is the impact of regulation, both by the SEC and 
by the exchanges. Neal and Reiffen have started the process of sorting out the 
relative importance of some of these effects. 
The most interesting part of the paper is the empirical analysis, and the inter- 
esting result is that there is no smoking gun that suggests that performance of 
the specialists degrades significantly after acquisition by a broker-dealer. This 
result must be qualified by a number of limitations of the analysis (most of 
which are due to data problems). For example, we have no data on commis- 
sions, whose contribution is ironically the part of performance that is easiest 
for the customer to observe. 
Price improvement is one of the important variables in the paper. Unfortu- 
nately, the measure of price improvement in the paper is not very satisfactory, 
due to data limitations. The measure in the paper takes the distance to the 
closest side of the spread, normalized to the spread midpoint. When the spread 
is one-eighth, according to this definition there is no price improvement (since 
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the stocks are quoted in  eighths), but that is not  necessarily the case. As I 
understand  the data, we do not even know  which trades were made by  the 
specialist (or which side the specialist took), and which trades were undertaken 
by floor traders or were negotiated upstairs and merely cleared on the floor of 
the exchange. 
The nature of price improvement can make vertical integration profitable for 
subtle reasons, given that the  specialists have the discretion to give special 
treatment to orders from their own firms. One form of  price improvement is 
the stopping of a trade by the specialist, who later has the option of letting the 
trade  stand with a counterparty from the limit order book or improving the 
price on own account. This is a free option that allows the specialist to profit 
with the submitter of the market order at the expense of the limit order book. 
For example, if the spread is 50-501/4,  a market order to buy may be stopped 
by the specialist at 50%, and tentatively matched with a limit order to sell at 
50%.  If the stock price subsequently falls (say to 49%-50),  the specialist can 
improve the market order’s price to 50% and take the other side of the trade. 
Selling at 50% is now profitable  to  the specialist, and the submitter of the 
market order also profits, both at the expense of  the limit order. If  the price 
rises, however, the submitter of the limit order is stuck with a losing sell. 
How can specialists use this price improvement mechanism to favor trades 
from their own firm and its customers? When given a choice of what orders to 
stop for possible price improvement, specialists can stop orders stamped with 
their firm’s name, which favors the firm’s customers and the firm’s own trade. 
Similarly, when tentatively matching a limit order to a stopped trade, the spe- 
cialists can avoid doing so with orders from their own firms. This is a subtle 
way that vertical integration can profit a specialist, and this could not be de- 
tected without much finer information. 
I liked the argument in the paper that a vertical integration of a specialist 
and a broker-dealer is a way for capturing the same rents one would obtain by 
selling order flow without  such an  obvious conflict  of  interest between the 
broker-dealer  and  its  clients. Of  course,  this  conflict  of  interest  is  no  less 
strong, even if it is less obvious. A broker-dealer that profits either from selling 
order flow or from sending the order flow to its own subsidiary specialist would 
have less incentive than it should to seek out the best execution for its clients. 
This is a clear conflict of  interest and is probably not in the public interest. 
Unfortunately, the paper has very little to say about this argument empirically. 
On  a related note, it would be useful if  we could measure the increased ro- 
bustness of the specialists, given a larger capital base. 
It is worth mentioning a few minor statistical issues. In general, I like the 
paper’s attempt to find controls for some of the effects, but this could be carried 
further. For example, normalizing spread by  price controls somewhat for the 
size of the stock price, but we do know that the proportional spread is related 
systematically to the size of the stock price. Similarly, there may be some selec- 
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merged because  they were insolvent after the crash, and it came out in the 
discussion that the specialists who merged were generally on the exchanges’ 
problem lists. It might be useful to compare these mergers to a sample of acqui- 
sitions by firms that are not broker-dealers. It might also be useful to categorize 
the results by large and small stocks. On a final statistical note, use of median 
statistics leaves out the outliers that may be the most interesting cases: median 
statistics suggest that there is no problem in the typical case, but in rare cases 
the mergers might be a real disaster. Of course, such analysis would require 
particular  care  to  make  sure  that  the  outliers  are  not  simply  due  to data 
problems. 
To  summarize, the integration of broker-dealers  and  specialists is a very 
interesting policy arena in with both  finance and industrial organization are 
important. It is interesting that the paper does not find any strong evidence of 
big changes in the performance of specialists following these mergers. How- 
ever, tests of  many  of  the potential effects are beyond our reach,  given the 
current data availability, and much work remains. 
Comment  Michael D. Robbins 
I believe the paper would have added value if it addressed the question, Who 
is advantaged when a broker directs order flow to his own captive specialist 
and  who  is  disadvantaged? A  distinction  between  regional  specialists  and 
NYSE specialists  should be sharpened.  The issue of  “price  improvement” 
when orders are exposed to the primary market should also be addressed. Are 
price improvement and fiduciary obligation quaint ideas? 
A clear study of the history, both recent and not-so-recent, of broker-dealer 
specialist integration would be useful.  How did Merrill Lynch back into the 
specialist business during the tumult of the 1987 crisis? How does it view the 
business today (1994)? Would it expand today? What caused the exit of Paine 
Webber from the specialist business? How much are regional  specialists de- 
pendent upon the liquidity exit they have on the NYSE? What about the stealth 
specializing done by  retail firms under rule  19c-3? Why do institutional (in- 
formed) investors get treated differently by integrated broker-dealer specialists 
than retail (uninformed) investors? My viewpoint, of course, is more pragmatic 
than theoretic because of my background-I  am a businessman rather than an 
academic, and I earn my living as an agent in the marketplace day after day. 
Experience has shown me that the major attribute of  a specialist organiza- 
tion has to be an understanding of the nature of risk. This is not always avail- 
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able abundantly in large, broad-based, integrated broker-dealers, but may be 
present in good measure in a small, tightly knit group of risk takers. 
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Our  goal  in  studying  the  effect  of  integration  between  specialists  and 
broker-dealers was twofold: to see if we could understand  the motivation for 
the integrations, and to draw policy implications concerning the desirability of 
future integration and payment for order flow. The comments of Dybvig and 
Robbins illustrate the significance of the issue discussed, as well as the poten- 
tial pitfalls in our study. 
A central issue addressed by both commentators is selectivity bias; that is, 
how does one explain which integrations took place, and how does the non- 
randomness of integrations affect the inference one can draw from our study? 
Dealing with the first issue, since these four NYSE specialists were presum- 
ably viewed by broker-dealers as the most desirable candidates for acquisition, 
it seems reasonable that the four differ from the fifty or so NYSE specialists 
that were not. We  agree with the commentators that it would be valuable to 
gain  some understanding  of  why  these particular  transactions occurred. To 
some extent, each event may be idiosyncratic, and hence it may be difficult to 
systematically explain the transactions. For example, it was suggested by both 
commentators that the first integration (Merrill Lynch acquiring Tompane) was 
motivated by  the specialist’s impending insolvency following the  1987 mar- 
ket decline. 
While newspaper accounts of that transaction confirm the specialist’s predic- 
ament, they also suggest that something else was going on. For example, while 
the timing of the acquisition was influenced by the market decline, the acquisi- 
tion apparently was not; negotiations between Merrill Lynch and Tompane had 
been ongoing for eighteen months prior to the acquisition (i.e., since the rule 
change). Similarly, the notion that Merrill Lynch bailed out a failing company 
does not appear consistent with the fact that there were other bidders for Tom- 
pane after the market decline, and that Merrill Lynch paid $10 million for a 
company with $5 million in debts. Finally, the Brady commission report noted 
that thirteen specialists had run out of liquidity on October 19, 1987, and most 
of those did not sell out to a broker-dealer, so clearly there were other sources 
of capital available to these specialists. 
In order to learn about whether there is a systematic relationship between 
the characteristics of  the specialist and the likelihood of integration, however, 
would require extensive information about the specialists. Unfortunately, it is 205  The Effect of  Integration between Broker-Dealers and Specialists 
difficult for someone outside the industry to learn much about the operating 
characteristics of the four specialists, as information such as profitability is not 
publicly available. Similarly, the NYSE ranks specialists in terms of the quality 
of their market making, but these ratings are not publicly available.’ 
One type of information that is available is the stocks in which each special- 
ist makes a market, and some measure of the specialists’ performance. These 
data are displayed in table 6.3 in our paper, Those data suggest that the stocks 
in acquired specialists’ portfolios tended to be slightly larger volume stocks, 
selling at higher prices. In regard to performances of the specialists, the infor- 
mation is somewhat mixed; while the four NYSE specialists were worse than 
the control group in capturing trading volume  (as measured in their market 
share), they did tend to have lower effective spreads than the control group. 
One final observation is that the four firms had on average a portfolio of eigh- 
teen  stocks, which is about half  the average for all NYSE specialists. This 
difference may reflect the lower NYSE ranking, as new listings are generally 
given to more highly rated specialists. Alternatively, it could be that smaller 
portfolios are not viable and must be combined with other business activities 
or other portfolios to achieve minimum viable scale. 
To  the extent that the four specialists were atypical of  NYSE  specialists, 
inference  about future integrations from our work  would be limited. If  the 
agency motivation were a valid explanation of the reason for integration, then 
these four integrations would represent those with the greatest potential for 
harm. To the extent that no such harm was found, future integrations may be 
even less likely to produce these adverse consequences. 
Dybvig notes that,  while our theoretical  analysis is based on specialists’ 
taking the opposite side of all incoming orders, in reality the NYSE specialists’ 
participation rate is considerably lower.* Many retail  orders execute against 
NYSE floor traders and against existing limit orders, or are matched with other 
retail orders. This fact by itself mitigates, but does not eliminate, the kinds of 
problems we describe. For example, one can think of agency problems existing 
even if  the probability is less than one that the integrated specialist has the 
opportunity to trade against the uninformed order flow. 
One way  of evaluating the consequences of  our assumption is to examine 
how our results change as the percentage of trades that involved the specialist 
changes. Of course, we cannot observe the percentage. One proxy for partici- 
pation rate of the specialist is the trading volume in a stock. Logic, as well as 
casual empiricism,  suggests that floor traders tend to congregate around the 
posts of heavily traded stocks. Additionally, it seems likely that crosses occur 
less frequently and limit orders are less effective in thinly traded stocks. For 
1. As Dybvig notes, the general impression among professionals is that these four specialists 
2. In the discussion during the conference, it was suggested that roughly 10 percent of NYSE 
tended to be among the lower-rated specialists. 
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both of these reasons, we would conjecture that, for any effective spread, the 
percentage of trades involving the specialist would be higher for thinly traded 
stocks. 
Based on this, we examined whether the effect of integration was different 
for thinly traded stocks. If  in fact we see diminution of  execution quality on 
these integrated stocks, but not on integrated stocks in general, it would sug- 
gest that the agency theory may be relevant when the specialist faces reduced 
competition from floor traders (as generally occurs on the regional exchanges). 
To  test this, we reran the regressions  in panel A in tables 6.4 and 6.6, using 
only those test and control stocks in the lower 50th percentile of all stocks in 
the relevant group. We found no significant differences between these results 
and those reported in the paper; the coefficients  changed little, although the 
standard errors rose due to smaller sample size. While it may be true that price 
improvement occurs less frequently for low-volume stocks, whatever advan- 
tages broker-dealers get from owning specialists do not appear to depend on 
the stock’s trading volume. 
Dybvig is correct when he notes that our measure of price improvement (and 
hence effective spread) is imperfect. Since we cannot observe whether an order 
is a buy or a sell, we cannot know the actual price improvement (or effective 
spread). In addition, our algorithm does not allow for price improvement when 
the bid-ask spread is one-eighth. These problems may contribute to the rela- 
tively low significance levels in our study. 
In sum, we agree that the study does not fully explain the motives for inte- 
gration, nor completely measure the effect. Nevertheless, we find it interesting 
that the data do not suggest that trading costs rose following integration. Our 
results therefore have significant implications for future integrations and for 
payment for order flow. 